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OF THE CONSTITUTION:  A CASE STUDY IN TEXTUAL AND 
HISTORICAL REVISIONISM 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* 
A recurrent challenge in modern constitutional law takes the fol-
lowing form:  a scholar produces a novel interpretation of the United 
States Constitution, based on creative textual analysis or original his-
torical research, and calls for a corresponding revision of constitu-
tional doctrine based on his or her insight.  How should other law 
professors, and especially judges and Supreme Court Justices, re-
spond?  Insofar as the novel and arresting thesis depends on claims of 
historical fact, historically minded scholars will want to look carefully 
at the supporting evidence and otherwise test it.  Sometimes even ini-
tial scrutiny will expose the claims as transparently unsupportable.  
Perhaps more frequently, work by others will reveal grounds for un-
certainty, but leave the new theory among a set of more or less plau-
sible competitors.  None will be decisively proven, but all will retain a 
claim to be taken seriously.  Then, with the ultimate truth of the tex-
tual or historical claim in a state of greater or lesser certainty, courts 
will need to decide how much, if at all, to rely on it. 
In his splendidly iconoclastic articles The Subjects of the Constitution1 
and The Objects of the Constitution,2 Nicholas Rosenkranz draws atten-
tion to a feature of the Constitution’s language and structure—
involving the juxtaposition of provisions written in the passive voice 
with others that speak in the active voice and have clear subjects—
that nearly everyone else, including constitutional experts, had previ-
ously overlooked.  Having done so, he advances a spectacularly crea-
tive argument that according due significance to the subjects and ob-
jects of diverse constitutional provisions would not only have 
significant substantive implications, but also force an even more pro-
foundly important restructuring of constitutional litigation.3  For 
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 1 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
 2 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011). 
 3 See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210–11 (promising a “new model of judicial review”). 
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both scholars and judges, coming to terms with Rosenkranz’s theory 
is now an important agenda item. 
In this short Article, I shall express some grounds for respectful 
skepticism, both about whether Rosenkranz has proven his claims 
and about whether courts should decide cases on the basis of his ar-
guments, even if judges thought him more likely right than not about 
the significance that well-informed Americans of the Founding gen-
eration would have attached to the “subjects” and “objects” of the 
Constitution.  But, I also hope to train attention on the general 
methodological challenge—partly for other law professors working in 
the field and especially for judges and Justices—that work such as 
Rosenkranz’s poses:  How should we appraise, and what significance 
should we attach to, ingenious, provocatively novel theses that would 
make constitutional outcomes depend wholly on seemingly plausible, 
but not clearly proven linguistic and historical claims? 
I.  PROFESSOR ROSENKRANZ’S INFERENCES FROM THE CONSTITUTION’S 
SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS 
According to Professor Rosenkranz, the Constitution’s text and 
structure clearly establish that the most fundamental question in any 
constitutional case is always who has violated—or is capable of violat-
ing—the particular provision in question.4  When “the who question”5 
is framed, it will sometimes have obvious answers, especially in cases 
involving the powers of and the restrictions applying to the federal 
government.  The answer will be unmistakable when a provision is 
written in the active voice, as is the First Amendment, which says, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”6  The Commerce Clause also has “Congress” 
as its subject,7 as does Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.8  
Similarly, many of the provisions of Article II have “the President” as 
their subject.  A number of clauses in Article III, which confers judi-
cial power, are also written in the active voice. 
By contrast, many other constitutional guarantees—especially in-
cluding the provisions of the Bill of Rights other than the First 
 
 4 Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1006; Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210. 
 5 Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210. 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
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Amendment—are written in the passive voice.  When a provision is 
written in the passive voice, Rosenkranz maintains that we need to 
figure out who is its “object.”9  For example, to whom does the Fourth 
Amendment apply or whom does it restrain?  In nearly every case, he 
says, the answer to questions about the “objects” of constitutional re-
straints can be discerned from the Constitution’s structure.10  For ex-
ample, because only the Executive can effect a search and seizure, the 
answer to the Fourth Amendment “who question” involving searches 
and seizures is “the President.”11  With regard to a variety of proce-
dural guarantees in Amendments V through VII—such as, rights to 
trial by jury and the assistance of counsel—Rosenkranz infers that it is 
the courts who are bound.12 
When we move from constitutional restrictions on the federal 
government to constitutional restrictions on the states, Rosenkranz 
acknowledges that answering “the who question” can be trickier.13  
The difficulty largely comes from the partial “incorporation” of the 
Bill of Rights that he believes occurred through the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14  It takes careful his-
torical work to determine which provisions are and are not incorpo-
rated, and which were redefined in the process.  But once these issues 
are resolved, constitutional grammar again dictates a good deal, he 
argues.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause says, “No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”15  Perhaps most often, all three branch-
es of state governments will apparently be bound as either potential 
 
 9 Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1010. 
 10 Id. at 1027. 
 11 Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1034–35; Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1241. 
 12 Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1046–50. 
 13 See id. at 1024 (“It may be tempting to say that all of these clauses apply to all three 
branches of state government, because they say only ‘No State shall.’  But textual analysis 
does not end there.  Structural logic might demonstrate that some such clauses are lim-
ited to only one or two branches of state government.” (footnote omitted)). 
 14 See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1054–55 (following Akhil Amar in arguing that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause incorporates “the individual-rights aspects of the Bill of 
Rights” but not its structural aspects).  Contrary to what Rosenkranz believes the Consti-
tution’s text and history require, the modern Supreme Court has incorporated the Bill of 
Rights against the states using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Nevertheless, he is not alone in believing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be 
the more historically plausible source of incorporation doctrine.  See, e.g., McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063–83 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (presenting 
exhaustive historical evidence supporting incorporation through the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, not the Due Process Clause); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 118–21, 156–63 (2012) 
(making a similar argument). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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makers or enforcers of laws that abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens (including, for example, the freedom of speech).16 
According to Rosenkranz, careful attention to “the who question” 
would dictate important changes in the substance of constitutional 
law.  For example, because Congress is the subject of the First 
Amendment, Rosenkranz concludes that action by the President 
cannot violate the Free Speech, Free Exercise, or Establishment 
Clauses.17  And because he believes that nearly all of the Bill of Rights 
guarantees that are written in the passive voice have the President or 
the courts, not Congress, as their objects, he argues that no law that 
Congress might pass could possibly violate most provisions of the Bill 
of Rights.18 
As startling as the implications of his thesis would be for substan-
tive constitutional doctrine, Rosenkranz thinks his conclusions have 
even more revolutionary implications for the structure of constitu-
tional litigation and, in particular, for currently vexed issues about 
the availability of facial and as-applied challenges.  According to 
Rosenkranz, the answer to “the who question” determines whether a 
constitutional challenge is facial or as applied.19  A challenge brought 
under a constitutional provision that has “Congress” as its subject is 
inherently facial, Rosenkranz argues, because if Congress oversteps its 
powers, then it necessarily does so at the moment when it legislates, 
with the effect that it failed to produce any valid law at all.20  A court 
 
 16 See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1057 (“[T]he Framers [of the Fourteenth Amendment] 
could not be certain precisely who, at the state level, would pose each sort of threat to lib-
erty.  Therefore, the Constitution never expressly singles out branches of state govern-
ment when limiting state power; instead, it says either ‘No State shall’ or ‘by any State.’” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 17 See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1261 (“[T]he executive branch cannot violate the Estab-
lishment Clause on the merits—for the simple reason that the executive branch is not the subject 
of the First Amendment.”). 
 18 Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1050–51. 
 19 Believing that constitutional challenges are necessarily challenges to actions by particular 
actors, rather than to statutes, Rosenkranz initially mocks the doctrine that attempts to 
sort challenges to statutes into distinctive categories of “facial” and “as-applied.”  See 
Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1229–30 (“[T]he terms themselves are misleading malaprop-
isms.”).  It swiftly turns out, however, that he believes his theory will give rigorous content 
to those currently disordered categories by determining which constitutional challenges 
are necessarily facial—in the sense of framing the question whether Congress successfully 
enacted any law at all, id. at 1238—and which cannot be facial because they arise under 
constitutional provisions that restrain the President or the courts, not Congress.  Id. at 
1241–42; see Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1007, 1050–51 (explaining that a challenge to 
legislative action is a facial challenge, whereas a challenge to an executive action is an as-
applied challenge). 
 20 Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1238 (“If Congress has violated the Constitution by making 
an impermissible law, then it has violated the Constitution at the moment of making the 
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confronted with a proper First Amendment challenge must therefore 
determine whether a challenged act of Congress either falls or stands 
in its entirety. 
In constitutional litigation under provisions that have the Presi-
dent or the judiciary as their subject or object, the structure of consti-
tutional litigation is necessarily wholly different, Rosenkranz main-
tains.  According to him, the idea of facial challenges under such 
provisions is nonsensical.21  If a provision limits the powers of the 
President or the courts, rather than Congress, then a constitutional 
challenge under that provision must necessarily address the action of 
the President or a court.  To be sure, the President or a court might 
sometimes act to enforce a law that a provision of the Bill of Rights 
forbids the President or a court to enforce.  For example, the Presi-
dent or a court might follow a congressional directive to impose cruel 
or unusual punishments.  Even in such a case, however, Rosenkranz 
argues that a challenge is necessarily to the actual or anticipated pres-
idential or judicial action in applying the statute, which is of course to 
say that the challenge, to the extent it involves a statute at all, can on-
ly be to a statute as-applied.22  It cannot be a facial one. 
Once again, matters are more complicated in the case of chal-
lenges to actions by state officials because the crucial language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to “make or enforce any law” 
that infringes the rights that the Amendment guarantees.  If I under-
stand correctly, Rosenkranz thus believes that at least some state legis-
lation can violate incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights and be 
vulnerable to challenges on its face, even if substantively identical 
federal legislation would not.23  The key distinction is that the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids state legislators to “make,” as well as state 
executives or judiciaries to “enforce,” laws, and it therefore becomes 
possible for state legislatures to violate the “incorporated” Fourth or 
Eighth Amendment, for example,24 even though Congress could not 
 
law.  And so, it must be possible to identify a constitutional flaw on the face of the statute 
itself.  Thus, a ‘facial challenge’ is nothing more nor less than a claim that Congress (or a state leg-
islature) has violated the Constitution.”). 
 21 Id. at 1238–42. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1066–67 (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause begins 
‘No State shall.’  So the privilege against state takings may run against state legislatures, as 
well as state executives, and it may forbid regulatory takings as well as physical takings.”).  
For whatever reason, Rosenkranz’s discussion of incorporation in Objects passes over most 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that are written in the passive voice. 
 24 I do not exclude the possibility that I might be mistaken in my account of the implica-
tions of Rosenkranz’s theory for Fourth or Eighth Amendment litigation, as he does not 
specifically discuss this subject.  It seems clear, however, that in his view the language of 
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violate the original Fourth or Eighth Amendments (because they 
have the President or the courts as their objects). 
II.  METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Rosenkranz’s thesis about the implications of the “subjects” and 
“objects” of the Constitution is original, ingenious, and bracing.  A 
fair appraisal requires excavating beneath his substantive claims to 
identify his methodological assumptions.  As is evident on the sur-
face, Rosenkranz’s methodology is resolutely textualist.  Constitution-
al law is in a state of confusion, he writes, and the confusion, “like 
most confusion in law, stems from insufficient attention to text.  Indi-
vidual words are important, of course, but equally important is textu-
al structure. . . . [C]areful attention to constitutional grammar can 
reveal—and will reveal—nothing less than the constitutional struc-
ture of judicial review.”25  When the Constitution’s text speaks clearly, 
Rosenkranz generally looks no further in attempting to support his 
conclusions.  If uncertainty would otherwise exist—for example, 
about who are the objects of constitutional provisions written in the 
passive voice—he refers to constitutional structure to find resolu-
tion.26 
Appeals to the Constitution’s text and structure are by no means 
unusual or even controversial in constitutional law.27  But Rosenkranz 
appears to go further than most in claiming that the Constitution’s 
text and structure almost uniquely determine constitutional out-
comes.  Albeit with some trepidation, I think it fair to conclude that 
his argument rests upon three methodological assumptions, each of 
which will provide a useful point of departure for inquiry into the 
persuasiveness of his conclusions. 
First, Rosenkranz assumes that the appropriate “structure of judi-
cial review”—including the availability of facial challenges—flows di-
rectly, nearly as a matter of entailment, from the meaning of constitu-
tional provisions conferring and limiting the powers of Congress, the 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a different set of rules governing facial challenges 
to state action than the language of Article I and the Bill of Rights makes appropriate in 
challenges to action by the federal government. 
 25 Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210. 
 26 See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1016 (“As Marshall demonstrated, the subjects of the 
active-voice clauses can help identify the implicit objects of the passive-voice clauses.”). 
 27 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 84–85 
(1982) (listing such “textual” and “historical” arguments among the recognized modali-
ties of constitutional argument); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195–98, 1200–01 (1987) (discussing 
arguments from the Constitution’s text and structure). 
Nov. 2013] TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL REVISIONISM 459 
 
President, the courts, and the states.  On an alternative view, constitu-
tional adjudication properly derives its structure, at least partly, from 
traditions and doctrines that have more to do with constitutional 
“implementation” than with textual “meaning.”28  In my view, an apt 
illustration comes from the “severability” doctrine, under which the 
courts, when confronting a statute with some unconstitutional parts 
or applications, will sometimes determine that even if a statute is inva-
lid in part, the valid parts can be separated and remain valid, judicial-
ly enforceable law.29  Another example comes from the “strict scruti-
ny” test, under which courts will invalidate legislation that infringes 
on fundamental rights, unless the statutory restriction is “necessary” 
or “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling governmental interest.”30  No 
provision of the Constitution includes any such language.  No one 
has ever traced the strict scrutiny test to the original understanding of 
any constitutional guarantee.  The Supreme Court essentially invent-
ed the formula in a series of cases decided during the 1960s.31  Yet the 
 
 28 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37–42 (2001); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1275, 1276, 1281–85 (2006).  Some originalists embrace an analogous distinction between 
the constitutional meaning that emerges from interpretation, which may sometimes be 
only vague or abstract, and the “construction” that courts permissibly engage in when 
they create doctrinal tests to enforce or apply partially indeterminate language.  See, e.g., 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
118 (2004) (“Although both constitutional legitimacy and the commitment to a written 
constitution necessitate reliance upon the original meaning of the text, originalist inter-
pretation has its limits—limits that inhere in the use of language to guide conduct.”); 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 7 (1999) (“When political actors systematically make such ar-
guments with little regard for balancing such textual components, it makes more sense to 
recognize that they are engaged in a different activity than to accuse them of making 
‘bad’ interpretations.”). 
 29 For discussions of statutory severability, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challeng-
es to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 249–51 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1349–51 
(2000); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203(1993); Michael D. 
Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 231–32 
(2004); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 742–43 (2010); 
cf. Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating 
In Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 319 (2012) (arguing that commentators including Professor 
Rosenkranz have erred by failing to distinguish “constitutional decision rules,” which de-
termine whether statutes are constitutionally valid or invalid, from “invalidation rules,” 
which determine whether the appropriate remedy for an invalid statute is severance or 
total nullification”). 
 30 E.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 
(2005); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992). 
 31 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268–75 (2007). 
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strict scrutiny test survives—and I would say appropriately—as a well-
designed device for implementing otherwise vague constitutional 
strictures that could not sensibly be treated as absolute, yet deserve 
more protection than a balancing test afforded.32  It will not escape 
attention that the strict scrutiny test, as currently employed, some-
times measures the constitutionality of legislation under constitution-
al provisions that do not have “Congress” as their grammatical sub-
jects.33 
Second, Rosenkranz’s reference point for ascertaining the mean-
ing of the Constitution’s text and structure appears to be what is 
sometimes described as its “original public meaning.”34  This is not a 
necessary assumption for a textualist theorist to make.  An avowed 
textualist might, for example, eschew historical inquiries and focus 
just on the Constitution’s text and grammar as they would present 
themselves to twenty-first-century interpreters untutored in constitu-
tional history.35  Or one might assume that the Constitution’s text re-
flects aspirations that call for interpretation in light of moral princi-
ples.36  But I take Rosenkranz to want to interpret the Constitution’s 
words and structure as they would have been understood by intelli-
gent, grammatically adept, and informed members of the generation 
that adopted relevant constitutional language.  Rosenkranz’s linkage 
of his textualism to a form of originalism emerges most clearly in his 
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He bases his conclusion 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause partially incorporates the Bill 
of Rights almost entirely on evidence adduced by other scholars con-
cerning the original public understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.37 
 
 32 Id. at 1292. 
 33 E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (announcing that all racial classifications imposed by the 
federal government are subject to strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause). 
 34 See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1144–45 (2003) (“Original meaning . . . asks not 
what the Framers or Ratifiers meant or understood subjectively, but what their words 
would have meant objectively—how they would have been understood by an ordinary, 
reasonably well-informed user of the language, in context, at the time, within the relevant 
political community that adopted them.” (footnote omitted)). 
 35 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 208–09 (1980) (discussing the possibility of divergence between the meaning of the 
Constitution’s text when it was ratified and its meaning today). 
 36 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 14–16 (2011); RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–38 (1996). 
 37 See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1052 & n.259 (highlighting the scholarly consensus that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates aspects of the Bill of Rights against the states 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
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Third, Rosenkranz’s constitutional interpretive methodology ap-
pears to afford little, if any, role to post-ratification precedent or to 
concerns about sound policy.  Almost never does he discuss prece-
dent as potentially relevant to how the Constitution should be inter-
preted today, even when he calls for sweeping revisions of current 
doctrine, and he rarely alludes specifically to considerations of func-
tional desirability.  Although I agree with Rosenkranz that the Consti-
tution’s text, structure, and history are important, I, like many others, 
believe that other considerations, including precedent and conse-
quences, should also matter to constitutional adjudication.38  Settled 
precedent should not be cast aside lightly.  When there is a choice 
between otherwise legally plausible arguments and interpretations, 
considerations of normative desirability should affect the balance.39 
In the next three Parts of this Article, I shall follow the avenues of 
inquiry that these three methodological assumptions respectively 
suggest.  I shall begin by questioning Rosenkranz’s assumption that 
the meaning of constitutional language should necessarily determine 
the structure of judicial review.  Then, assuming for the sake of ar-
gument that the structure of judicial review should reflect the mean-
ing of the provisions on which Rosenkranz rests his thesis, I identify 
some respects in which more work would be required to give ade-
quate support to his textual and historical arguments.  Finally, I turn 
to issues involving the pertinence of precedent and value- or policy-
based arguments to constitutional adjudication.  Although I allude 
briefly to the much mooted issue of whether and if so when prece-
dent should trump what otherwise would be the clearly ascertainable 
 
 38 See, e.g., FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 45–55 (developing 
a “typology of constitutional argument”); Fallon, supra note 27, at 1194–209 (discussing 
various “kinds of factors that the Court characteristically and appropriately takes into ac-
count” in resolving constitutional matters).  Even some originalists would make excep-
tions for to their otherwise originalist theories to continue to adhere to well-established 
precedent.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 411–12 (2012) (“The chief barrier against a wrenching 
purge—by originalism or any other theory of interpretation—is the doctrine of stare 
decisis.”). 
 39 My approach to constitutional theory and my defenses of the methodological commit-
ments described in the text are “interpretive” in Professor Dworkin’s sense of the term.  
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986) (characterizing “interpretive” theories 
as reflecting interacting considerations of “fit” and normative attractiveness).  For further 
discussion of Dworkin’s approach to American constitutional practice, see Fallon, supra 
note 27, at 1192 & n.11, 1231–37.  Following Dworkin, I believe that a theory of interpre-
tation of the Constitution of the United States should aspire to fit and rationalize the im-
plicit rules and understandings that have evolved to structure interpretation of our par-
ticular Constitution—most of which was written in the eighteenth century—at this point 
in constitutional history. 
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constitutional meaning, I shall focus more on issues—which I believe 
that Rosenkranz’s work raises—about the pertinence of precedent 
and policy when evidence regarding the originally understood public 
meaning is plausibly viewed as supporting dramatically novel conclu-
sions, but is not clear-cut. 
III.  THE ROLE OF “IMPLEMENTING” DOCTRINES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 
Although Rosenkranz seems to regard it as beyond question that 
the original public meaning of provisions empowering and restrain-
ing non-judicial branches of government should determine the struc-
ture of judicial review, that proposition is by no means self-evident.  
For my own part, I believe—as even some originalists 
acknowledge40—that questions concerning how courts should imple-
ment the Constitution turn partly on considerations besides the 
claims about the meaning of the provisions empowering and restrain-
ing government actors on which Rosenkranz entirely rests his case.  
Above I gave two examples of judicially developed doctrines to im-
plement the Constitution that lack clear foundations in the Constitu-
tion’s text or the original public meaning of particular constitutional 
provisions.  One involved modern severability doctrines, the other 
strict judicial scrutiny.  As I shall explain more fully below, 
Rosenkranz appears to reject the possibility of statutory severability 
under constitutional provisions that have “Congress” as their gram-
matical subjects.  And he plainly insists that statutes cannot be sub-
jected to “facial” tests such as the strict judicial scrutiny test under 
provisions that have the President or the courts as their objects. 
In my view, if Rosenkranz’s thesis aims wholly to overthrow or sub-
stantially to displace doctrines such as these, then it would generate 
unacceptable consequences, and his proposal to restructure constitu-
tional litigation in light of the subjects and objects of the Constitution 
should be rejected on that basis.  Alternatively, if Rosenkranz were to 
construe his theory as leaving a substantial scope for implementing 
doctrines that are not strictly derivable from the Constitution’s text 
and structure, and for severability doctrines in particular, then his 
proposed restructuring of constitutional litigation would have rela-
tively little practical bite.  If there is a “Goldilocks” interpretation of 
Rosenkranz’s thesis that constitutional meaning dictates the structure 
of constitutional litigation in all cases—one under which it would be 
 
 40 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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neither too strong to be tolerable nor too weak to be interesting—
then it will take more work by Rosenkranz to show exactly what it is.  
Or so I am presently inclined to believe.  To develop this thesis, I will 
look first at the cases that Rosenkranz says uniquely and necessarily 
involve facial challenges, and then at those that he says are inherently 
as applied, and see what would follow if his prescriptions were adopt-
ed.  I shall then, finally, say a few words about the application of his 
thesis in cases challenging actions by the states and their officials. 
A.  Separability Doctrine in First Amendment Litigation 
With respect to challenges that Rosenkranz depicts as necessarily 
facial, his thesis would be too strong if it allowed no room whatsoever 
for separability by insisting that any statute with even a single invalid 
application is therefore necessarily unconstitutional in toto.  Imagine, 
for example, that Congress enacts a multi-part revision of the tax 
code.  Although most parts of the statute do not affect the freedom of 
speech in any way, assume that one provision (out of hundreds) pro-
vides for a special levy on the press.  That provision, we may suppose, 
violates the First Amendment.41  The question then is:  does the stat-
ute stand or fall as a whole, or can the provision providing for a levy 
on the press be severed from the rest, so that the remainder can 
stand?  Modern severability doctrine would clearly call for partial, ra-
ther than total, invalidation of the statute, with all but the flawed pro-
vision surviving.42  So, I believe, would common sense.  If 
Rosenkranz’s theory required a different result, then I would adjudge 
it too strong.  It would dictate a potentially grievously improvident 
outcome—imagine vast chunks of the tax code being thrown out as 
unconstitutional as tax day approached!—and for no particularly 
good end. 
The consequences of Rosenkranz’s position would be even 
stronger, stranger, and less tolerable if it applies to cases in which leg-
islation is enacted in the form of a multi-part package that spans a va-
riety of topics.  Suppose Congress enacts, and the President signs, a 
bill that, in different sections, makes appropriations for the Defense 
 
 41 Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 590 
(1983) (invalidating a state tax that disproportionately burdened the press). 
 42 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (concluding 
that although the Medicaid “portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the Constitu-
tion,” the remedy for that violation “does not require striking down other portions of the 
Affordable Care Act”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 328–36 
(2010) (considering the “facial” constitutionality of one section of a federal campaign fi-
nance statute without suggesting that other parts of the law might be invalid). 
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Department, funds but also reduces benefits under an entitlement 
program, and amends the tax code.  If Rosenkranz would maintain 
that a single provision that infringed the freedom of speech could 
not be severed from the rest, then his stance would seem to me not 
only disturbingly imprudent, but also bizarre. 
As I noted above, however, I do not mean to press my objection 
too strongly, for Rosenkranz might be able to qualify his thesis.  He 
might imaginably say, for example, that each provision of a multi-part 
statute should count as a distinct law unto itself and that only the in-
valid provision should therefore be struck down, even though the 
provisions were all packaged together and the vote on some of them 
might have depended on the packaging.  Admission of this foothold 
for severability doctrine would weaken his thesis quite considerably, 
however, and begin to undermine his claim that it would have sharp 
practical implications. 
Now consider a different example, designed to test whether a sen-
sible approach to First Amendment litigation does not sometimes re-
quire recognition of the separability of statutory language even within 
a single provision.  Suppose Congress enacts a provision making it a 
crime to ship in interstate commerce any material that is “obscene or 
lewd.”43  Let us assume that the statute would be valid if it prohibited 
the shipment only of “obscene” material but invalid if it prohibited 
the shipment only of “lewd” material.  Must the provision stand or fall 
as a whole on the ground that it is all one law?  Under modern sever-
ability doctrine, the prohibition against the shipment of “lewd” mate-
rial would be struck down, but the prohibition against obscenity 
would continue to stand.44  To me, this would seem the clearly most 
sensible result.  Indeed, as I shall explain below, I would think it po-
tentially defensible, even on Rosenkranz’s preferred ground of textu-
al meaning:  it would be linguistically plausible to read the First 
Amendment’s command that Congress may make “no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” to permit a distinction, 
within a statute, between “law abridging the freedom of speech,” 
which is thus invalid, and law that does not abridge the freedom of 
speech and therefore can stand.  If Rosenkranz’s theory will not per-
 
 43 Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (addressing the constitutionality of a federal 
statute restricting “obscene or indecent” speech on the Internet). 
 44 See id. at 883 (effectively striking the words “or indecent” from the statute while allowing 
the rest to stand); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction about Facial Challenges, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 915, 955 (2011) (“[T]he Court will reject a facial challenge on severability 
grounds if it can identify a relatively surgically precise way of curing the [constitutional] 
defect . . . .”). 
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mit this result, I would again conclude that it is “too strong.”  The 
theory would impose substantial costs—and arguably, quite gratui-
tously so, if severability is permitted in the hypothetical case of a mul-
ti-part statute, only one part of which trenches on the freedom of 
speech. 
Now, finally, consider a case in which modern separability doc-
trine would view some invalid statutory applications—as distinct from 
bits of statutory text—as separable from valid ones.45  An example 
might be a statute forbidding federal employees from participating in 
federal election campaigns.46  Must it be either valid in toto or invalid 
in toto?  Once again, modern separability doctrine would allow inva-
lid applications to be severed from valid ones, at least as long as the 
statute is not substantially overbroad.47  By contrast, Rosenkranz quite 
clearly wants to forbid severability in this kind of case.  According to 
him, statutes that are challenged under the First Amendment are ei-
ther valid or invalid on their faces,48 and here, I am assuming, there is 
nothing that can be severed from the face of the statute. 
Even in this kind of case, there are two interlocking difficulties 
with Rosenkranz’s apparent stance toward severability doctrine that, 
in conjunction, point to the conclusion that his position is unaccept-
ably strong.  First, the demand that statutes with some allegedly inva-
lid applications must be judged without possibility of separability 
would impose nearly impossible burdens on courts to specify exactly 
what a statute means on the first occasion of its application.  In order 
to know whether a statute had even a single invalid application, a 
court would need to be able to imagine—when the statute was first 
challenged—every possible case to which it might, as a matter of stat-
utory construction, apply.49  To be sure, the implementing doctrines 
that now structure constitutional adjudication require some effort by 
 
 45 See Fallon, supra note 44, at 928 n.48 (“The presumption of severability can apply both to 
linguistically distinguishable bits of statutory text and to invalid applications of an other-
wise undifferentiated statutory provision.”). 
 46 Cf. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 568–81 (1973) 
(rejecting an anticipatory over breadth and vagueness challenge to the Hatch Act, which 
forbade federal employees from taking an “active part in political management or in po-
litical campaign” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2))). 
 47 See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–78 (1995) (find-
ing a statute forbidding federal employees from speaking or writing invalid as applied to 
lower-level employees, but noting that the rationale of the decision would not necessarily 
apply to, and that the statute might be applied against, higher-level employees). 
 48 See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1236 (“A challenge to an action . . . of Congress must be ‘faci-
al.’”). 
 49 See Fallon, supra note 29, at 1330–31 (discussing the difficulty of specifying a statute’s 
meaning in the absence of concrete examples to anchor the analysis). 
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the courts to determine how broadly a statute extends to hypothetical 
cases.  To determine whether a statute is “substantially overbroad” or 
“narrowly tailored” to a compelling interest, a court must make a 
rough determination of the range of cases to which a challenged pro-
vision would extend.  But a court need not decide in advance wheth-
er a statute would apply to every imaginable case that it might reach, 
because a few invalid applications would not suffice to invalidate a 
statute in toto.  Second, at the conclusion of its effort to specify 
whether a statute would apply to all imaginable cases that might gen-
erate questions about its reach, a court would potentially need to 
hold the statute facially invalid on the basis of unlikely occurrences or 
bizarre hypotheticals.  This approach would require a vast departure 
from traditional approaches to First Amendment litigation that have 
made “substantial over breadth” a condition of facial invalidation.50  
The now prevailing approach to severability in First Amendment liti-
gation has, on the whole, proved sensible in practice.  In my view, a 
court should hesitate long before adopting an approach with such 
substantial practical drawbacks as Rosenkranz’s appears to have.51 
B.  Doctrinal Tests That Structure Facial Challenges 
Just as the meaning of the First Amendment should not dictate 
the scrapping of separability doctrine (even if Rosenkranz were right 
about the meaning of the First Amendment), neither should the 
meaning of constitutional provisions that have the President or the 
courts as their objects dictate that facial challenges are categorically 
impossible under such provisions.  Once again, implementing doc-
 
 50 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–73 (1982) (holding that a statute chal-
lenged as unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment will not be invalidat-
ed on that ground unless it is “substantially overbroad”). 
 51 Even European constitutional courts that have the power to exercise “abstract review”—
that is, to make a preenforcement determination of a law’s constitutionality outside of 
ordinary litigation between adverse parties—will often sever unconstitutional applications 
of statutes and employ saving constructions and balancing tests in order to narrow the 
range of future cases in which a law can be applied, rather than make all-or-nothing de-
terminations of its validity.  See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Re-
view:  And Why It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2777–78 (2003) (highlighting 
similarities between European abstract review and American facial challenges).  Notably, 
recent experience in France suggests that a system of pure abstract review is undesirable 
insofar as courts cannot subsequently invalidate constitutionally troubling applications of 
statutes that survive initial review.  See Gerald L. Neuman, Anti-Ashwander:  Constitutional 
Litigation as a First Resort in France, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 18 (2010) (pointing out 
that constitutional difficulties sometimes arise too late for review).  Other countries avoid 
this difficulty by supplementing abstract review with “concrete” review arising from ordi-
nary litigation.  Id. 
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trines—including tests, such as the strict scrutiny formula, that can 
frame facial challenges—have an important role to play that no strict-
ly grammatical thesis could or should displace. 
Just for the sake of argument, let us stipulate that Rosenkranz has 
correctly identified the meaning of the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
written in the passive voice:  in nearly every case, they express prohi-
bitions directed against the President and the courts, rather than 
Congress.  Even if we assume that many of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights have the President and the courts as their immediate objects, 
this assumption would not answer the question of how courts should 
approach cases in which the trigger for presidential or judicial action 
would arise from a law enacted by Congress.  To see why, imagine 
that Congress enacts a law directing officials of the executive branch 
to engage in allegedly unconstitutional action.  For example, suppose 
Congress passes a statute requiring the performance of a strip search 
before any person of Middle Eastern descent is permitted to board an 
airplane.  Not wishing to submit to the indignity of a discriminatory 
strip search, a person of Middle Eastern descent sues for an injunc-
tion. 
In a case such as this, in which a statute furnishes the occasion 
and motivation for executive or judicial action by purporting to com-
pel it, what is at issue for all practical purposes is the validity of Con-
gress’s statutory directive.  And it seems to me only sensible that the 
courts should be able to structure litigation, as they now do, in light 
of the practical realities.52  Within the currently prevailing doctrinal 
 
 52 Rosenkranz defends the practical attractiveness of his approach by citing the case of Unit-
ed States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Supreme Court found that congres-
sionally authorized federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment as ap-
plied to some cases.  “Having framed the issue this way, the Court then had no choice but 
to embark upon an adventure in lawmaking by severance” that his approach would have 
avoided, he argues.  Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1048.  With regard to Booker, the details 
of the Court’s severability holding seem to me to be mistaken, largely for the reasons that 
Justice John Paul Stevens advanced in a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the 
statute should have been severed differently.  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 272–73, 283 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting in part).  Yet the Court’s more basic decision to treat the challenge to the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines as one that could potentially have resulted in facial invali-
dation seems to me to have been correct.  Acting pursuant to powers that include the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress had purported to make the Sentencing Guide-
lines mandatory in every case to which they applied.  In order to determine whether the 
mandate could be applied to the Booker case, the Court had to reach conclusions about 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment that showed the extent to which the Guidelines 
could and could not be applied to other cases.  Thus far, I would say, the Court’s mode of 
proceeding could not be faulted.  Moreover, if the Court then went awry in its severability 
analysis, then its case-specific error by no means shows the desirability of a wholesale 
abandonment of severability doctrine.  Among its other implications, such abandonment 
could lead to improvident rulings that entire statutes are invalid based on provisions or 
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framework, a court would ask whether a statute directing the Presi-
dent to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin is neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest.53  If the court 
applied that test, and if the statute failed it, then the conclusion 
would follow that the statute was invalid on its face. 
In resisting the conclusion that my hypothesized case involves a 
properly facial challenge, Rosenkranz might choose either of two al-
ternative lines of analysis.  First, he might insist on overthrowing the 
existing doctrinal structure by, for example, maintaining that a court 
should simply ignore the law that Congress has enacted or, perhaps, 
treat it as relevant only for establishing that a plaintiff of Middle East-
ern descent was likely enough to be strip-searched to have standing to 
sue.  Under this approach, litigation would focus on the permissibility 
of executive officials’ strip-searching of the particular parties to a par-
ticular lawsuit, not the permissibility of the discriminatory classifica-
tion contained in the statute.  The question would be whether the in-
dividual search was “unreasonable,” not whether the classification 
violated equal protection.54  If Rosenkranz took this position, then his 
thesis would seem to me to be “too strong.”  In my judgment, an in-
sistence that the courts could not address the permissibility of Con-
gress’s directive would be objectionably obfuscatory and ultimately 
dysfunctional because it would wash out of the case both the reason 
that the threat of a strip search would seem real—namely, the hypo-
thetical statutory directive—and one of the principal grounds for ob-
jection—namely, the mandated discrimination on the basis of race or 
national origin.55  More generally, Rosenkranz’s analysis would 
threaten the use of many currently applicable doctrinal tests, includ-
ing strict judicial scrutiny, to enforce any constitutional guarantee 
that does not have “Congress” as its grammatical subject.  If constitu-
tional litigation could not focus on statutes in challenges to federal 
action under provisions not having “Congress” as their subjects, then 
 
applications that would now be deemed severable, as I have argued above.  An argument 
that attacks severability doctrine as applied to all cases is therefore too strong.  And an ar-
gument that severability doctrine was misapplied in a particular case fails to establish the 
need for a restructuring of constitutional adjudication that would eliminate severability 
questions across the board. 
 53 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
 55 Insofar as the permissibility of race-based classifications would now occur under the Due 
Process Clause, a further question would be whether Rosenkranz would tolerate the ap-
plication of this branch of “substantive due process” at all.  See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, 
at 1042 (“[S]etting . . . substantive due process to one side, the object of the Due Process 
Clause is not Congress, but the President.”). 
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the occasions for litigation would multiply radically.  It would be 
much harder to establish that the rationale for a decision in one 
case—for example, finding that it would be unreasonable to strip 
search a particular person absent greater grounds for individualized 
suspicion than her family heritage and any other currently known 
facts supplied—would apply to another case.  If so, the efficacy of the 
courts as guarantors against governmental misconduct would dimin-
ish accordingly. 
Eschewing this “too strong” position, Rosenkranz might alterna-
tively maintain that his claim that most Bill-of-Rights-based challenges 
are necessarily as-applied is a purely logical one, with few practical 
ramifications:  as a formal matter, the court can only inquire into 
what the Executive can permissibly do, even if, as a practical matter, 
the court must do so by applying a doctrinal test, such as the strict 
scrutiny formula, that focuses on whether Congress had sufficient jus-
tification for enacting a statute purporting to require executive action 
of a particular kind.  If Rosenkranz’s thesis were construed in this 
way, then a court could render opinions making it clear that statutes 
prescribing unreasonable or discriminatory searches or cruel and 
unusual punishment could not be applied to anyone under any cir-
cumstances, and those opinions would serve as controlling prece-
dents in all future cases involving those statutes.  But this position 
would save Rosenkranz’s thesis only by making his claim that facial 
challenges are impossible under constitutional provisions written in 
the passive voice too weak to hold much interest. 
One further potential anomaly of Rosenkranz’s position also bears 
notice.  Suppose now that Congress authorizes a federal executive 
agency, subject to supervision by the President, to engage in rulemak-
ing, and suppose further that the agency issues regulations that, if 
enacted by Congress, would have been subject to facial challenge as 
invalid under the First Amendment.  Because the regulations were is-
sued by an executive agency, are they subject only to an as-applied 
challenge, even though they operate with the same force of law as 
would a statute that would trigger, and indeed demand, a facial chal-
lenge?  If so, then this odd consequence would heighten my sense 
that Rosenkranz’s thesis proves too much. 
C.  Different Rules for Challenges to State and Federal Legislation? 
In the articles that he has published to date, Professor Rosenkranz 
has said relatively little about the structure of litigation challenging 
state action and legislation under incorporated provisions of the Bill 
of Rights.  Once again, however, he would appear to confront a 
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“Goldilocks” problem.  Because most of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights apply against the states, and because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s incorporating language has “no State” as its grammatical sub-
ject, Rosenkranz appears to contemplate that state legislatures can vi-
olate guarantees that, in their unincorporated form, apply only 
against the President and the courts and that therefore would not 
permit facial challenges to congressionally enacted legislation.56  If 
constitutional adjudication were restructured in accordance with his 
thesis, a state statute prescribing unconstitutional searches or cruel 
and unusual punishments would thus be subject to a facial challenge, 
whereas an identical federal statute would not.  In the already con-
fused doctrine governing the availability of facial challenges, the in-
troduction of this distinction would predictably generate yet more 
vexation and inconsistency.  Alternatively, any interpretive complexity 
that Rosenkranz might introduce to avoid this odd conclusion would 
risk undermining the bold revisionism in which the attraction of his 
thesis largely inheres. 
The problem here—if such is the word—is a general one: the 
more broadly a textual or historical thesis (such as Rosenkranz’s) 
sweeps, the more likely it is to generate tension not only with settled 
interpretations of constitutional language, but also with judicially es-
tablished tests and mechanisms for implementing otherwise vague 
language and historical understandings.  Sometimes revisionary the-
ses should undoubtedly be accepted.  At the very least, however, 
recognition of a distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional implementation should cause one to think twice about 
when theses about the historical meaning of constitutional language 
should displace implementing devices—such as those reflected in 
separability doctrine and the “strict judicial scrutiny” test—that find 
their justifications more in functional than in purely linguistic or his-
torical grounds in the first place. 
IV.  SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION’S ORIGINAL PUBLIC 
MEANING 
In arguing that the “subjects” and “objects” of constitutional pro-
visions do not necessarily dictate the entire structure of judicial re-
view, I have so far assumed that Professor Rosenkranz has accurately 
identified the original public meanings of the various provisions on 
which his thesis depends.  But determining whether he has applied 
 
 56 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
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his own methodological assumptions correctly in all cases will also 
pose some daunting challenges for those seeking to come fully to 
grips with his claims.  In so saying, I mean to tread cautiously.  I am 
neither a legal historian nor an accomplished practitioner of the art 
of reasoning from “structure and relationship”—the phrase coined by 
Charles Black to describe the interpretive methodology of discerning 
the meaning of one constitutional provision through inferences con-
cerning its interconnections with others.57  Accordingly, I am unpre-
pared to characterize Rosenkranz as having erred on any specific his-
torical or linguistic point.  Nevertheless, it is easy to identify instances 
in which the cautious among us will want to await more evidence and 
argument before making up our minds.  Two examples will suffice to 
illustrate the point. 
One involves Rosenkranz’s largest claim, which is that the struc-
ture of judicial review that he champions emerges inexorably from 
the Constitution’s grammar and original public meaning.58  Insofar as 
this is a historical claim, assessment of its validity depends on an ex-
amination of how reasonable members of the Founding generation 
would have understood the judicial role in constitutional cases.  This 
question has spurred the development of a large literature, marked 
by myriad theories concerning the anticipated judicial role.59  Accord-
ing to some scholars, the historically predominant view was that 
courts would invalidate legislation only in cases of clear mistake by 
the legislature concerning the Constitution’s requirements.60  Accord-
ing to others, it was widely understood that all of the branches of 
government would interpret the Constitution for themselves, with ju-
dicial interpretations enjoying no hierarchical “supremacy.”61  Before 
embracing Professor Rosenkranz’s textually and historically based 
conclusion that all First Amendment challenges are necessarily facial 
challenges—to take just one particularly salient example—I would 
 
 57 See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1969).  Reasoning from structure and relationship can be difficult to execute per-
suasively.  BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 84–85.  Since Black himself, the most masterly prac-
titioner of the art is Akhil Amar.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 747 (1999). 
 58 See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210 (“[C]areful attention to constitutional grammar can 
reveal—and will reveal—nothing less than the structure of judicial review.”). 
 59 For a brief summary, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70–72 (6th ed. 2009). 
 60 See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1990); 
Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review:  In De-
fense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 342–49. 
 61 E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 106–11 (2004). 
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want to test it carefully against the complex, conflicted body of evi-
dence bearing on Founding-era expectations concerning the judicial 
role. 
Without having purported to carry out the requisite inquiry, I 
would call attention to one recent work of historical scholarship that 
seems closely on point.  In a study of historical understandings of 
statutory severability, or the question whether invalid portions or ap-
plications of statutes can be severed from valid ones, Professor Kevin 
Walsh argues that courts in the early nineteenth century declined to 
enforce statutory provisions insofar as they were “repugnant” to the 
Constitution, but took it for granted that challenged provisions oth-
erwise remained enforceable.62  I do not know whether Walsh re-
viewed the relevant cases with Rosenkranz’s thesis in mind or whether 
subsequent researchers might reach a different conclusion if they 
parsed the data set to distinguish constitutional cases based on the 
varied grammatical “subjects” of the diverse constitutional provisions 
under which challenges were brought.  Nevertheless, Walsh’s scholar-
ship suggests that it is a historically open question whether constitu-
tional provisions conferring powers and establishing restraints on 
Congress and the President would have been understood to have the 
implications for the structure of judicial review that Rosenkranz 
claims. 
A second example of a question meriting careful assessment in-
volves Rosenkranz’s more specific claim about the precise prohibition 
that the First Amendment embodies.  As I construe his argument, he 
believes that when the First Amendment prescribes that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” the term 
“law” refers to the totality of any bill that Congress passes and the 
President signs.63  To test this claim, let us begin by recalling two hy-
pothetical statutes that I introduced earlier:  one is a multi-part tax 
statute, with just one provision that abridges the freedom of speech, 
and the other is a prohibition against the shipment in interstate 
commerce of any “obscene or lewd” material, under doctrinal rules 
that permit the regulation of “obscenity” but not of lewd publications 
that fall short of being obscene.  Above I argued that even if these 
statutes constituted laws abridging the freedom of speech, the gram-
matical structure of the First Amendment should not preclude sever-
 
 62 Walsh, supra note 29, at 765–67. 
 63 See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1236–37 (approvingly quoting Thomas Jefferson’s deter-
mination that a successful First Amendment challenge renders an “act of the Congress” 
altogether void). 
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ability doctrines that would uphold their valid parts.  Now I want to 
suggest a different possible objection to Rosenkranz’s thesis. 
Although Rosenkranz seems to assume that the phrase “no law” 
must refer to the entirety of any bill that Congress enacts and the 
President signs, it would seem just as linguistically plausible to me to 
conclude that insofar as my hypothesized statutes trench on “the 
freedom of speech,” they constitute “law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech,” and thus are invalid, but that insofar as they do not abridge 
the freedom of speech, they are “law that does not abridge the freedom of 
speech” and can therefore stand.  In other words, I would think it lin-
guistically plausible, in light of the evident purpose of the First 
Amendment to protect only utterances that lie within “the freedom 
of speech,” to hold that the word “law” does not necessarily refer to 
entire enactments, but can sometimes refer instead, more narrowly, 
to the specific dictates or prohibitions that legislation establishes.  In 
short, purely as a twenty-first-century linguistic matter, it does not 
seem to me to be absolutely necessary to conclude that a statutory 
provision that has nothing to do with speech—as in the multi-part tax 
statute that I hypothesized—is “law abridging the freedom of speech” 
just because it is packaged with law that plainly does abridge the free-
dom of speech.  If I am right that the language of the First Amend-
ment does not necessarily dictate Rosenkranz’s conclusion, it would 
be wiser, in my judgment, to follow the counsel of John Marshall that, 
when a provision would permit both a provident and an improvident 
interpretation, the more provident interpretation should be pre-
ferred.64 
So far, however, in discussing what the First Amendment does and 
does not proscribe, I have talked only about twenty-first-century lin-
guistic intuitions, not about the Amendment’s original public mean-
ing.  It is, of course, a distinct, historical question how informed, lin-
guistically competent Americans of the Founding generation would 
have understood the First Amendment’s application to cases involv-
ing statutes that overstep constitutional bounds in part, but only in 
part.  In reference to this question, to which I do not pretend to 
know the answer, suffice it to say that Rosenkranz’s evidence seems 
somewhat thin.  Apart from noting that Thomas Jefferson pardoned 
 
 64 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819) (“Is that construction of 
the Constitution to be preferred which would render [government] operations difficult, 
hazardous, and expensive?  Can we adopt that construction (unless the words imperiously 
require it,) which would impute to the framers of that instrument, when granting these 
powers for the public good, the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a 
choice of means?”). 
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all violators of the Alien and Sedition Acts,65 he offers almost no evi-
dence concerning eighteenth- or early-nineteenth-century under-
standings.  Not being an originalist, I would not necessarily regard 
such evidence as determinative of how the Constitution ought to be 
interpreted today, but I would, at least, think it relevant in assessing 
whether Rosenkranz had established his thesis about the original 
public meaning. 
Imaginably, Rosenkranz might take exception to this assertion.  As 
I have said, I understand his theory to embody claims about the orig-
inal public meaning of relevant constitutional provisions, not about 
how members of the eighteenth-century public actually understood 
them.  This is a subtle but significant difference.  Questions about 
original public meaning are partly hypothetical:  they ask how an in-
telligent, well-informed, grammatically adept person would have cor-
rectly understood the meaning of a provision.66  And the answers to 
such questions will not necessarily depend on what members of the 
Founding generation, who might have misapprehended the meaning 
or proper application of the words of the First Amendment, actually 
thought.67  At the very least, however, actual-eighteenth-century un-
derstandings would provide relevant evidence of what the words of 
the First Amendment meant in their eighteenth-century context. 
To summarize, although Rosenkranz’s historical and linguistic 
claims appear plausible, and may indeed be correct, I do not think 
that he has so far marshaled enough evidence to rule out all plausible 
competing views about the implications of the Constitution’s text and 
structure with respect to some highly salient points, notably including 
the meaning of “no law” in the First Amendment. 
V.  THE PERTINENCE OF PRECEDENT AND PRUDENCE IN CASES OF 
TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL UNCERTAINTY 
The final line of analysis that I wish to pursue involves the perti-
nence of judicial precedent and prudence in assessing not only 
Rosenkranz’s theory, but also other similarly revisionary theories that 
depend on claims about original constitutional meanings.  To begin, 
let us imagine that a litigant presses a constitutional claim that all 
 
 65 See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1235–38. 
 66 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1 (2011) (distinguishing between the original meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause and original expectations concerning its application and arguing that its original 
public meaning forbade sex-based discrimination that tended to subordinate women 
even if most of the public did not so apprehend in 1868). 
 67 Id. 
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agree cannot succeed unless she can persuade a court—let us sup-
pose it is the Supreme Court—to embrace Professor Rosenkranz’s 
thesis.  For example, imagine that the litigant demands the total in-
validation of a multi-part tax statute, only one provision of which 
bears in any way on the freedom of speech.  In considering what the 
Court, or one of its Justices, ought to do in light of the arguments 
and evidence that Rosenkranz has so far presented, let us put aside 
my argument that courts should sometimes employ “implementing” 
doctrines that are not dictated by the Constitution’s linguistic or his-
torical meaning.  We can assume, instead, that the question is solely 
about how to interpret the phrase “no law” as it appears in the First 
Amendment.  On this assumption, the question becomes just how 
persuasive would Rosenkranz’s arguments and evidence need to be to 
justify a court in deciding a case on the basis of it. 
In framing this question, I want to distinguish it from the question 
that would arise if a court adjudged that Rosenkranz had decisively 
proved his thesis.  Even then, of course, it would remain debatable 
whether stare decisis ought to prevail over the originally understood 
linguistic implications of “the subjects of the Constitution.”  In my 
view, past judicial precedents permitting the severance of statutes 
challenged on First Amendment grounds, coupled with the practical 
costs of adopting Rosenkranz’s prescriptions, would probably justify a 
deviation from the original textual meaning.68  Some originalists 
might agree,69 though others, of course, would not.70  But I shall not 
dwell on this scenario because in the case of Rosenkranz’s thesis, as of 
most original theses about the Constitution’s semantic and historical 
meaning that are presented for the first time in the twenty-first centu-
ry, the notion that there could be no significant uncertainty is almost 
certainly unrealistic (even if it is theoretically imaginable). 
I thus return to the question of what a judge ought to do with 
Rosenkranz’s thesis if she thought it quite plausibly correct—let us 
say fifty-one percent likely to be right—but not clearly proven.  When 
 
 68 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008) (defending the proposition that initial-
ly erroneous precedent should sometimes prevail over what otherwise would be the best 
interpretation of the Constitution’s meaning). 
 69 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 411–14 (embracing a role for stare decisis in 
constitutional adjudication). 
 70 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not as Radical as It 
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (maintaining that although originalism can 
accord limited roles to stare decisis, “[w]here a determinate original meaning can be as-
certained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should be 
reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place”). 
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this assumption is conjoined with others that I have made in framing 
the issue, Rosenkranz’s theory presents a recurring problem or puz-
zle, but one that is rarely formulated in general terms.  A large, pro-
vocative, and controversial literature debates the pertinence of origi-
nal understandings or original public meanings to constitutional 
adjudication, but most often on the assumption that original public 
meanings are known.  Too seldom discussed is the very real and 
common problem of how judges should deal with textual and histori-
cal uncertainty, as presented when path-breaking scholarship pre-
sents plausible but not clearly demonstrated claims of textual mean-
ing or historical truth. 
In many cases, we know that members of the Founding generation 
disagreed among themselves about the meaning or application of 
constitutional language.  James Madison famously said that because 
the Constitution was vague in many respects, its meaning would need 
to be “liquidated” through subsequent practice and precedent.71  But 
the Framers could, and did, disagree, even in cases in which the con-
tending parties did not acknowledge vagueness.  Uncertain about 
whether the Constitution would permit Congress to create a Bank of 
the United States, George Washington—who had presided over the 
Constitutional Convention—sought the advice of then-Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson and then-Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton.72  Jefferson answered no, Hamilton yes.73  To cite just one 
more example, James Madison believed that Congress’s power to tax 
and spend for the general welfare74 was limited to taxing and spend-
ing in connection with the exercise of other enumerated congres-
sional powers.75  Hamilton, by contrast, thought that Congress’s pow-
er was a more general one, confined only by the requirement that 
exactions and outlays must aim to promote the general welfare.76 
The difficulty of generating reasonably determinate, demonstrably 
true conclusions about the original public meaning of constitutional 
language is surely not a reason to abandon the quest for historical 
knowledge or to eschew reliance on close textual analysis as a consid-
 
 71 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 72 Joseph M. Lynch, The Federalists and The Federalist:  A Forgotten History, 31 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 18, 21–22 (2000). 
 73 Id. at 21–23. 
 74 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
 75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 258–59 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 76 Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (1791), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 446–47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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eration in constitutional adjudication.  Nonetheless, an awareness of 
the frequently provisional and uncertain character of even scrupu-
lously developed textual and historical claims furnishes a ground for 
concluding that it would be deeply misguided for the Supreme Court 
to renounce existing doctrine and reach an otherwise improvident 
conclusion whenever five Justices are provisionally persuaded by new 
textual and historical scholarship.  A theory that would base all deci-
sions exclusively on what seems to be the best available textual and 
historical evidence, even when that evidence is sketchy or mixed and 
has not yet withstood the test of time, could easily produce an endless 
process of doctrinal reformation and counter-reformation. 
In my view, the uncertainty of the arguments and evidence sup-
porting Rosenkranz’s thesis should thus be deemed highly pertinent.  
As I have explained, I think that the language of the First Amend-
ment would permit other readings.  Simply as a policy matter, it 
would seem imprudent to prescribe across the board that statutory 
validity must always be an all-or-nothing matter under constitutional 
provisions with Congress as their grammatical subject.  And I would 
therefore conclude that precedents establishing the possibility of 
statutory severability, like many other entrenched precedents that 
may be incompatible with the Constitution’s original understanding 
or original public meaning, ought to be followed. 
My interests here, however, are as much methodological as they 
are immediately substantive.  Whether one agrees or disagrees with 
my policy judgments, Rosenkranz’s thesis seems to me to raise a clear, 
potentially hard question about how ready courts should be to em-
brace radically revisionist theories that might reasonably be deemed 
more likely than not to be true, but that certainly are not clearly es-
tablished, in light of the currently adduced arguments and evidence.  
Assuming that textual and historical claims can be more or less se-
curely supported by evidence, I doubt that any algorithm could be 
produced to specify exactly how well supported any particular claim 
should have to be in order to justify an otherwise regrettable constitu-
tional decision.  I am very confident, however, that the essence of 
good judging lies in good practical judgment.  Although I do not 
fault Professor Rosenkranz for failing to address the significance of 
uncertainty and prudence in constitutional adjudication, I think  
these considerations highly pertinent to how the courts should re-
ceive his theory. 
Scholars have a different role.  To those of us who teach Federal 
Courts and Constitutional Law, Rosenkranz has presented a chal-
lenge that we cannot responsibly ignore. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Subjects of the Constitution and The Objects of the Constitution are 
ingenious and provocative.  They make a rich contribution to scholar-
ly and historical debate.  In this Article, I have tried to express my 
admiration for Professor Rosenkranz’s contribution to ongoing 
scholarly discussion, while at the same time advancing reasons for 
skepticism about his largest theses, which awe me with their boldly 
imaginative sweep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
